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INTRODUCTION 
Law professors fondly observe that the law is always catching 
up with technology. What else could it do? Legislators could 
hardly be expected to anticipate scientific discoveries. 
Technological foresight is rarely a campaign promise or the basis 
for selecting elected officials. Judges are rarely experts in science 
and engineering. Gone are the days of Benjamin Franklin, 
Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Rush, when scientists and 
inventors were also lawgivers. 
Is there, however, something insightful we can gather from 
the oft-noted, and facially obvious, observation that regulation 
follows invention? Perhaps by looking at why earlier invention 
sparked regulation, we can understand whether, or how, modern 
invention will produce legal limits. 
                                                                                                             
 *  Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law, J.D. University of 
Virginia; LL.M., J.S.D. Yale Law School. 
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The question has particular relevance for the rapidly 
emerging methods of modern communication. The recent pace of 
development in communication technology leaves privacy interests 
in the new media considerably unprotected by comparison with 
traditional means of communication. The government must jump 
over considerably more legal hurdles to listen in on telephone 
conversations than it does to obtain e-mails or discover where a 
cell phone user traveled.1
The gap between emerging technologies and laws protecting 
privacy interests in those communications is hardly new. Few 
technologies have seen explosions both in sophistication and 
widespread use as electronic communication. For America’s first 
century, methods of communication did not change, though the 




Lawmakers anticipated privacy concerns in e-mails, texts, 
and instant messages no better in the twentieth century than 
their counterparts in the nineteenth century. Nineteenth-century 
government investigators were able to obtain the contents of 
telegrams with simple subpoenas, subject to effectively no judicial 
supervision.
 Then, and almost overnight, communication 
technology took a great leap forward as telegraphs, and soon 
thereafter telephones, became commonplace in major cities. 
Roughly a century later, another revolution occurred in the way 
society communicates. 
3 Likewise, early twentieth-century police officers 
were not required to receive authorization to intercept telephone 
calls.4 However, the law did eventually “catch up” with technology 
as limits were placed on the government’s ability to intercept 
telegraph and telephone communications.5
                                                                                                             
 1 Haley Plourde-Cole, Back to Katz: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the 
Facebook Age, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571, 589 (2010). 
 
 2 Sharon K. Sandeen, In for a Calf is not Always in for a Cow: An Analysis of the 
Constitutional Right of Anonymity as Applied to Anonymous E-Commerce, 29 HAST. 
CONST. L.Q. 527, 536 n.24 (2002) (citing CARL H. SCHEELE, NEITHER SNOW NOR 
RAIN . . . : THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES MAILS (1970)). 
 3 See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, America’s First Wiretapping Controversy in Context 
and as Context, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 205, 216 (2011). 
 4 Id. at 234-35. 
 5 Id. at 226-31 (describing protections in telegraph communications); Neal Katyal 
& Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA 
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It is not clear that the law will do the same in the twenty-
first century. Much has changed since our last communications 
revolution roughly a century ago. The interest groups that shaped 
privacy expectations after our first communications revolution are 
not as powerful as they were a century ago. The American Civil 
Liberties Union, for instance, does not have the influence 
organized labor had in the early twentieth century. Corporate 
privacy advocates have also changed. Today, they come with 
unclean hands. Telephone and telegraph companies argued for 
their customers’ privacy against government intrusion.6 Providers 
of modern communications services argue for their customers’ 
privacy from the government, but while selling customers’ 
information to advertisers for a fee.7
I. HISTORY AND EXPANSION OF TELEGRAPH COMMUNICATION 
 The history of communication 
technology, and its protection from the government’s prying eye, is 
relevant to predicting how the law will regulate recent 
innovations. Telegraph communications offered the first 
alternative to the existing and quite slow method of getting 
messages from one place to another. Remarkably fast Pony 
Express riders could get letters from St. Louis to California in 
eight days, beating the pace of stage coaches by twelve days. 
Telegrams, by contrast, permitted messages to travel thousands of 
miles almost instantly. 
Samuel Morse conceived of the electromagnetic telegraph in 
1832, built an experimental one in 1835, and constructed a truly 
practical system in 1844.8
                                                                                                             
Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1041-47 (2008) 
(describing emerging protection of telephone privacy). 
 Telegraph technology achieved 
“commercial practicability” in major eastern cities between 1845 
 6 See United States v. Babcock, 24 F. Cas. 908 (E.D. Mo. 1876) (first of a number 
of cases in which Western Union challenged a subpoena for disclosure of the contents of 
telegrams); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 
598 (2009) (describing amicus brief of telephone companies in Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). 
 7 See Cade Schmidt, Google Doesn’t Do Data Mining; Er, Is That a Joke Too?, 
REGISTER (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/09/23/schmidt_on_ 
colbert/. 
 8 The Morse Telegraph, HISTORY WIRED: A FEW OF OUR FAVORITE THINGS, 
http://www.historywired.si.edu/object.cfm?ID=306 (last visited Jan. 21, 2012). 
974 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5 
and 1846.9 Messages could be conveyed across the Atlantic Ocean 
by this device by 1858.10 Telegraph messages, however, remained 
a tool for commercial transactions or highly important personal 
communications as these messages were billed at high rates by 
the syllable.11 These messages were also, by definition, less than 
completely private. Regardless of any laws designed to ensure 
privacy of the customer’s messages, it was inevitable that at least 
the operator and transcriber would know the contents.12
With the invention and widespread use of telegraph and 
telephone technology, it was initially assumed that the 
government had complete access to any message passed across 
these media. The sender revealed the contents of his message to a 
third party, the telegraph or telephone carrier, and thus lost his 
expectation of privacy in the messageat least he lost his 
expectation from government intrusion. High profile government 
intrusions on these forms of communication outraged the 
providers of these new forms of technology, as well as their 
customers, who had reason to fear that sensitive information 
might be intercepted. 
 
II. GOVERNMENT INTRUSION OF TELEGRAPH TECHNOLOGY AND 
SOCIETY’S REACTION 
Though telegraph technology was available from the mid-
nineteenth century, it was expensive and rarely used. The Civil 
War awakened potential customers to the value of instantaneous 
communications. Military commanders used the wires to transmit 
orders and reporters used the wires to relay news.13 Civilian use 
of telegraphs increased dramatically after the war.14
                                                                                                             
 9 Richard B. DuBoff, Business Demands and the Development of the Telegraph in 
the U.S., 1844 to 1860, 54 BUS. HIST. REV. 459 (1980). 
 
 10 This system, however, broke down after two works of operation and would only 
be restored after the Civil War. RICHARD F. SEKER, CIVIL WAR AMERICA 58 (2006). 
 11 Oliver, supra note 3, at 234. 
 12 See Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of 
Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 577-78 (2007). 
 13 LEWIS COE, THE TELEGRAPH: A HISTORY OF MORSE’S INVENTION AND ITS 
PREDECESSORS IN THE UNITED STATES 51-65 (2003). 
 14 Richard R. John, Recasting the Information Infrastructure for the Industrial Age, 
in A NATION TRANSFORMED BY INFORMATION: HOW INFORMATION HAS SHAPED THE 
UNITED STATES FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 55, 81 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. 
& James W. Cortada eds., 2000); U.S. CONG., REPORT ON POSTAL TELEGRAPH 10 (1884). 
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The value of eavesdropping on this method of communication 
that came of age during the war was also quite apparent. 
Intercepting military messages became a matter of deadly sport. 
For obvious reasons, there was no expectation of privacy in these 
communications. Messages were sent in code because of the high 
likelihood of interception.15 The coded messages were often 
published in newspapers where the public’s assistance in 
deciphering these messages was sought.16
After the war, government investigators quickly discovered 
the value of the medium that required information to be disclosed 
by the sender to the telegraph company. With the end of the 
hostilities, they did not have to be as crafty as the military spies 
who intercepted telegraphs. Permanent records of messages 
remained in the possession of telegraph companies.
 
17
Investigations early in the telegraph era revealed that 
telegraph customers had considerably less expectations of privacy 
than postal customers. Some of these investigations were very 
low-tech. During the impeachment proceedings against President 
Andrew Johnson, Congressman Benjamin Butler sent private 
detectives to indiscriminately seize copies of thousand of 
telegrams passing in or out the telegraph offices in Washington 
and Baltimore.
 
Investigators merely had to obtain access to these records to 
determine messages had been exchanged. 
18 Some of the telegrams were seized to 
substantiate the charges against Johnson.19 Following his 
acquittal, Butler used the telegrams to support his claims that 
Kansas Senator Edmund Ross had been bribed to vote for 
acquittal.20
                                                                                                             
 15 DAVID HOMER BATES, LINCOLN IN THE TELEGRAPH OFFICE 49-67 (Univ. of Neb. 
Press 1995) (1907). 
 
 16 TOM WHEELER, MR. LINCOLN’S T-MAILS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN USED THE TELEGRAPH TO WIN THE WAR 100 (2006). 
 17 1855 Pa. Laws 531 (requiring telegraph operators “to preserve the originals of all 
[telegraph] messages sent from such office . . . for at least three years . . . .”); see 
generally MORRIS GRAY, A TREATISE ON COMMUNICATIONS BY TELEGRAPH 115 (1885) 
(explaining the rights of action against telegraph companies because in order to be 
criminally liable under the statute there must be a right of action). 
 18 DAVID J. SEIP, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30 (1978). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 31. 
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Government investigators after the impeachment did not rely 
on such thuggish tactics to obtain telegrams. A subpoena duces 
tecum for telegrams provided the imprimatur of judicial 
authorization without any meaningful oversight of a court. Most 
states had statutes forbidding a telegraph company from 
disclosing the contents of a message to anyone but the intended 
recipient, but the statutes, on their face, largely left unclear 
whether these messages could be disclosed to criminal 
investigators or courts.21
The use of a subpoena, as opposed to Benjamin Butler’s 
methods, provided the nation’s primary telegraph company an 
opportunity to object to the seizure of copies of telegrams before 
the fact. The first high-profile objection to complying with a 
subpoena for telegrams involved an allegation of political 
corruption. Federal prosecutors suspected that President Ulysses 
S. Grant’s personal secretary, Orville Babcock, was tipping off St. 
Louis distilleries about raids to discover tax evasion.
 Courts never construed these statutes to 
limit the scope of the subpoena power. 
22 They 
obtained a subpoena for all the telegrams sent between Grant’s 
secretary and a revenue agent in St. Louis for an eight-month 
period.23 In modern criminal cases, we are accustomed to the 
defendant seeking to prevent the prosecution from using evidence 
on the basis that his privacy rights have been intruded upon.24
                                                                                                             
 21 See HENRY HITCHCOCK, INVIOLABILITY OF TELEGRAMS: A PAPER READ AT THE 
SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 26 (1879) (observing 
that only Missouri and Indiana had laws prohibiting telegraph operators to divulge the 
contents of telegrams but expressly provided an exception when the information was 
requested by a court). Hitchcock’s otherwise excellent research appears to have omitted 
at least one state, Pennsylvania, which had a similar exception. 1855 Pa. Laws 531. 
 In 
these early telegraph subpoena cases, the telegraph company 
 22 ROY MORRIS, JR., FRAUD OF THE CENTURY: RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, SAMUEL 
TILDEN, AND THE STOLEN ELECTION OF 1876 at 25-26 (2003). 
 23 United States v. Babcock, 24 F. Cas. 908 (E.D. Mo. 1876). 
 24 In fact, in the modern era the telegraph company would lack standing to object 
to even an illegal search that produced evidence against one of its customers. See 
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 (1980) (even egregious trespass upon 
privacy and property interests of bank’s employee does not provide remedy for bank’s 
customer); see also Jerry E. Norton, The Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the 
Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 261, 296-97 (1998) (criticizing Payner and 
three other cases that established a standing rule permitting the exclusionary rule to 
apply “only [to] the person whose Fourth amendment right” was disregarded). 
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itself objected to producing information that could be used to 
incriminate its clients. 
Western Union, obviously attempting to assure its customers 
their privacy would be protected, objected to such a sweeping 
request for telegrams.25 The telegraph company argued that the 
government had not shown the information they sought could be 
found within these documents. Their arguments dealt both with 
the degree of suspicion required to obtain the documents and the 
amount of specificity required of the request.26 A vast amount of 
their customers’ private communications would be delivered to the 
government with such requests. The federal court rejected 
Western Union’s concern, requiring only that subpoenas identify 
needed telegrams “with that degree of certainty that is 
practicable[;]” a criterion the court found satisfied by the 
government’s request in this case.27
Three years later, a congressional committee investigating 
the Presidential Election of 1876 issued subpoenas for an untold 
number of telegrams identified only by parties and a wide range of 
dates.
 
28 With the election too close to call, and allegations of fraud 
and voter intimidation in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina, 
a congressional committee subpoenaedamong others thingsall 
telegrams sent to or from eight prominent Louisiana Republicans, 
all suspected of involvement in voter fraud. The subpoenas for 
these men covered a four-month period.29
As it had done in the Babcock case, Western Union opposed 
the subpoenas for the telegrams. The testimony of the telegraph 
operator assigned to the New Orleans office was read before the 
congressional committee: 
 
I am instructed that a judicial or other subpoena couched 
in such general and sweeping terms would be in legal 
effect a general warrant, within the prohibition of the 
fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States, and subject to the condemnation of the great 
                                                                                                             
 25 Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1892, 1901 (1981). 
 26 Oliver, supra note 3, at 221-22. 
 27 Babcock, 24 F. Cas. at 909. 
 28 44 CONG. REC. H452 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1877). 
 29 Id.; MORRIS, supra note 22, at 175-85, 192-99, 203. 
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principles of personal liberty and private right established 
for all freemen of the Anglo-Saxon race by the celebrated 
judgments of Lord Camden in Wilkes’s case, and the case 
of Entick v. Carrington . . . .30
The committee rejected Western Union’s argument, 
concluding that customers’ privacy interest in the contents of 
telegrams did not defeat the superior interest of the government 
in discovering information.
 
31 The committee further rejected the 
analogy to general warrants.32 The subpoena itself was beyond 
constitutional challenge, according to the committee’s reasoning: 
“[I]n the hundreds of instances in which the subpoena duces tecum 
has been resorted to . . . the similarity which the witness supposes 
to exist between that writ and the ‘general warrants’ condemned 
by the constitutional provision cited by him has never yet been 
detected.”33 Of course, it was not the subpoena itself, but the use 
made of the subpoena, that Western Union claimed amounted to 
an indiscriminate search forbidden by the Constitution.34
Western Union continued to argue against requests for all 
telegraph communications passing between identified persons.
 
35 
In 1878, a state grand jury in St. Louis issued a subpoena for all 
the telegrams sent between four named persons over a fifteen-
month period.36 Western Union objected that such requests 
violated the federal and Missouri Constitutions’ prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures.37 This time, the Missouri 
Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Brown, accepted Western Union’s 
position.38
[S]hall at least give a reasonably accurate description of 
the paper wanted, either by its date, title, substance, or 
 The court concluded that Missouri’s constitutional 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures required that a 
subpoena: 
                                                                                                             
 30 44 CONG. REC. H454 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1877). 
 31 44 CONG. REC. H603 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1877). 
 32 Id. at 603-04. 
 33 Id. at 604. 
 34 Id. at 603. 
 35 Id. at 604. 
 36 Ex Parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 90 (Mo. 1880). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 93. 
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the subject it relates to . . . . To permit an indiscriminate 
search among the papers in one’s possession for no 
particular paper, but some paper, which may throw some 
light on some issue involved in the trial of some cause 
pending, would lead to consequences that can be 
contemplated only with horror, and such a process is not to 
be tolerated among a free people.39
The Brown particularity requirement, zealously advocated 
for by Western Union in a variety of settings, became the standard 
for telegram subpoenas throughout the nation.
 
40
III. HISTORY AND EXPANSION OF TELEPHONE TECHNOLOGY 
 The telegraph 
company’s continued zealous advocacy led courts to fashion some 
protections from the government’s ability to know the content of 
all telegraphed communications. 
One might imagine that late-nineteenth-century legislatures 
anticipated the possibility (or probability) that government 
investigators would have a similar interest in discovering the 
contents of telephone calls. Yet laws meaningfully protecting 
privacy in telephone conversations did not accompany this 
innovation in communication technology. 
The telephone, just a few decades behind the telegraph, both 
in invention and widespread availability, gave ordinary 
Americans access to immediate communications. Alexander 
Graham Bell’s telephone was first displayed at the 1876 World’s 
Fair in Philadelphia.41
                                                                                                             
 39 Id. at 94. 
 Two years later, the first telephone 
exchange opened in New Haven, Connecticut, and within a few 
 40 See Desai, supra note 12, at 582 (observing that after Brown, courts generally 
required specificity in warrants analogous to that required by the Missouri Supreme 
Court). While the United States Supreme Court recognized in Boyd v. United States, 
116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886), that the Fourth Amendment protected citizens from 
subpoenas for the production of their documents, subpoenas for telegraphed messages 
continued as those holding the records of those messages, either custodians of 
corporate records or telegraph offices, had no privacy or property interests in the 
contents of the messages. See Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 488 (1913); 
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); Ex Parte Gould, 132 S.W. 364, 374-80 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1910). 
 41 CHERYL GANZ, THE 1933 CHICAGO WORLD’S FAIR: CENTURY OF PROGRESS 79 
(2008). 
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years, telephone service was available in every major city in the 
country.42 Customers were much more willing to use telephones to 
communicate than telegraphs.43 Initially, subscribers were 
permitted unlimited use to encourage them to transfer to this 
method of communication from the telegraph service that billed by 
the message.44 By the 1890s, callers paid for the amount of their 
individual usage.45
Telephone conversations provided an immediate response, 
unlike the telegraph which required a chain of delivery and a wait 
period for a response. Telephones, at the turn of the twentieth 




IV. GOVERNMENT INTRUSION OF TELEPHONE TECHNOLOGY AND 
SOCIETY’S REACTION 
 
Laws written to ensure privacy in telegraphs were poorly 
adapted to account for the new technology of the telephone. In 
New York, for instance, statutory provisions prohibited 
interception of telegraphs and forbad telegraph companies from 
disclosing the contents of a telegram to anyone but the intended 
recipient.47 Telegraph companies were also forbidden to send 
messages that constituted or furthered a crime and were required 
to forward such messages to law enforcement authorities. With 
the development of telephone technology, the legislature simply 
added the words “or telephone” and “telegraph.”48
                                                                                                             
 42 JOHN E. KINGSBURY, THE TELEPHONE AND TELEPHONE EXCHANGES: THEIR 
INVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT 267 (1915). 
 While it was 
theoretically possible for telegraph operators to identify criminal 
messages before sending them, it was simply not possible with the 
telephone. Late nineteenth-century lawmakers lacked even this 
 43 Id. at 473. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.; see also MORRIS, supra note 22, at 23 (explaining that prepaid message 
requirements were likely to be considered a reasonable telegraph company regulation). 
 46 See AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, TELEPHONE STATISTICS 
OF THE WORLD 8-13 (1912) (describing that telephone use in the first decade of the 
twentieth century increased nearly ten times more rapidly than telegraph use). 
 47 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 641 (McKinney 1881). 
 48 1895 N.Y. Laws 518 (current version at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.35(1) (McKinney 
2008)). 
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basic insight and had not learned othermore subtlelessons 
from investigations involving telegrams. It should have been 
foreseeable that law enforcement would have an interest in 
learning the contents of telephone conversations, just as it had an 
interest in discovering the contents of telegrams. The laws 
nevertheless forbid any interception, whether by law enforcement 
or others. 
Despite these laws, just as with telegraph technology, 
government officials initially assumed there were no limits on 
their ability to intercept conversations passed along the wires. The 
New York City Police Department maintained a wiretap squad 
from 1895 that operated in secret.49 None of the evidence it 
obtained was ever introduced in court. Information obtained from 
the wiretaps was used only to aid in investigations, which kept the 
program from ever coming to light.50
A high-profile dispute in 1916 between the mayor of New 
York and the Catholic charities of New York ended the secrecy of 
what appears to have been this country’s first wiretapping 
program.
 
51 In an effort to demonstrate that priests were 
attempting to avoid testifying before a committee investigating 
their use of city funds, Mayor John Purroy Mitchel ordered the 
police department to intercept the calls of priests who were to 
testify.52
                                                                                                             
 49 Seymour Wires Tapped on Order Given By Woods, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1916, at 
1 (“The practice of wiretapping . . . goes back as far as 1895 . . . . The company . . . 
interpreted the law to mean that it was its duty to aid and assist the public officials in 
apprehending and detecting crime . . . .” (quoting John L. Swayze, general counsel of 
the New York Telephone Company)). 
 A Catholic member of the wiretap squad, having second 
thoughts about eavesdropping on a priest, revealed the mayor’s 
 50 STATE OF NEW YORK, MINUTES AND TESTIMONY OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE 
COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS 103 (1916) 
(testimony of Police Commissioner Arthur Woods), available at http://www.archive.org/ 
stream/cu31924083762942#page/n15/mode/2up. 
 51 See EDWIN R. LEWINSON & JOHN PURROY MITCHEL: THE BOY MAYOR OF NEW 
YORK 179-80 (1965); Meyer Berger, Tapping the Wires, NEW YORKER, June 18, 1938, at 
41. 
 52 Daniel Trucano, The Public Charities Controversy and John Purroy Mitchel, 
Mayor of New York City, 1914-17 (Apr. 10, 1970) (unpublished master’s thesis, St. 
Francis College) (on file with author). 
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actions and thus the existence of the entire wiretapping 
program.53
The disclosure of the previously secret police wiretap squad 
attracted considerable public attention.
 
54 There was an immediate 
fear that every New Yorker’s telephone conversations were being 
overheard. The police were able to convince the public that they 
were sufficiently competent at investigation and that the phones 
of few, if any, innocent persons were ever tapped.55 Police 
Commissioner Arthur Woods explained that the New York City 
police were not the bumbling constables Benjamin Cardozo 
described from the Framing Era.56 He explained that his 
professional police department had expertise in identifying 
criminals and was rarely wrong when it engaged in an intrusion 
as serious as a wiretap.57
For the most part, Police Commissioner Woods’s claim that 
the New York Police Department should be trusted to determine 
who to wiretap seemed to satisfy New Yorkers.
 
58 Charges against 
city officials for conducting the wiretapping were dropped.59 
Though laws were proposed in the legislature that year to limit 
the ability of police to decide when to eavesdrop on telephone calls, 
none passed.60 The mayor who ran against Mitchel’s clearly 
politically motivated wiretapping implemented only modest 
reform. Under his administration, police only had to obtain the 
approval of a prosecutor to conduct requested wiretapping.61
                                                                                                             
 53 Michael W. Clark, Mayor Mitchel, Wire-Tapping, and the Catholic Vote of 1917 
in New York City 28-29 (1965) (unpublished master’s thesis, St. Francis College) (on 
file with author). 
 Self-
regulation of wiretapping thus appears to have been largely in the 
 54 See Oliver, supra note 3, at 239 n.207. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). Of course police in the 1920s 
were not the constables of the Framing Era. They were considerably more powerful, 
with considerably more power and incentive to consciously disregard civil liberties than 
the colonial-era title constable suggested. See Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected 
History of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 505 n.319 (2010). 
 57 Oliver, supra note 3, at 241-44. 
 58 Id. at 244-45. 
 59 Acquit Kingsbury for Wiretapping: In Ordering Defendants Freed Court Says 
Evidence Did Not Indicate Bad Faith, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1917, at 20. 
 60 Oliver, supra note 3, at 245. 
 61 Id. 
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Progressive Era, a period when the public was willing to place 
extraordinary trust in the police. 
The famous, or infamous, Prohibition Era Supreme Court 
case Olmstead v. United States considered whether the Fourth 
Amendment placed limits on the power of the government to 
intercept telephone calls.62
The efforts of these telephone companies were unsuccessful. 
A closely divided Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect the sounds that callers transmit from their homes.
 Not surprisingly, several telephone 
companies filed amicus briefs contending that intercepting a 
telephone call amounted to a search or seizure within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment. Much like telegraph companies before 
them, they had an interest in reassuring their customers that 
their privacy was being protected. 
63 The 
holding was destined to be short-lived. The trust the public was 
willing to place in the police during the Progressive Era would not 
survive Prohibition. Law enforcement during Prohibition proved 
itself to be incompetent at best and hopefully corrupt at worst. At 
the federal level, the United States Supreme Court quickly 
reversed the effect of the Olmstead decision, holding that the 
Communications Act of 1934 prohibited wiretapping, though the 
language the Court was interpreting could hardly be read to 
requireor even suggestthat conclusion.64
Organized labor’s connections with organized crime made it a 
target for prosecutorial investigations, prompting labor’s keen 
interest in civil liberties.
 In New York State, 
an unlikely interest group joined the fight against unregulated 
wiretappingorganized labor. 
65
                                                                                                             
 62 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 In the 1930s, organized crime began to 
 63 Id. at 463-65. 
 64 Robert A. Pikowsky, The Need for Revisions to the Law of Wiretapping and 
Interception of E-Mail, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 28-31 (2003) (observing 
that the Supreme Court in the 1930s interpreted the Telecommunications Act of 1934 
to forbid wiretapping and that Congress did not modify the statute to permit 
wiretapping until the late 1960s). 
 65 See Oliver, supra note 56, at 521-22. William Nelson has described labor’s 
support for limits on wiretapping and searches as part of a struggle between elites for 
order and non-elites for security from the elite’s order-restoring apparatus. William E. 
Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth Century Constitutional Law, 
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 22 (1995). The linkage between organized labor and 
organized crime seems to provide a tighter explanation. 
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infiltrate labor unions. Before Prohibition, gangs sold violence. 
The use of violence and its linkage to organized crime was 
certainly foreseeable, as alcohol became a legal product again. 
Arnold Rothstein, the infamous gangster alleged to have fixed the 
1919 World Series, made a business of selling muscle to 
contending sides in labor strikes.66 In the Garment Worker’s 
Strike of 1926, he sold his product to both sides of the strike. 
Prohibition then created an easy and profitable market for 
contraband alcohol and made large criminal networks possible.67
Prohibition both distracted organized crime from the violence 
racket and made criminal organizations much more sophisticated. 
The end of Prohibition took away the easiest source of their 
income but did not destroy the criminal organizations. Bootleggers 
became mobsters; former peddlers of contraband infiltrated 
legitimate businesses. For a variety of reasons, organized labor 
became an easy target for mob infiltration. 
 
For legitimate and illegitimate reasons, labor was opposed to 
wiretapping. Trade unions were infiltrated by organized crime in 
the 1930s.68 In New York, mob-busting prosecutor Thomas Dewey 
focused on these groups.69
Labor groups specifically asked the New York Constitutional 
Convention of 1938 to forbid wiretapping except when judicially 
authorized.
 Corrupt unions obviously opposed his 
efforts to ferret out their wrongdoing. Legitimate unions objected 
to the unwelcomed government eavesdroppers itching to cobble 
together probable cause for an indictment. 
70 Their fear of government intrusion extended beyond 
eavesdropping. They asked the convention to include a provision 
that excluded illegally obtained evidence from criminal trials.71
                                                                                                             
 66 DAVID PIETRUSZA, ROTHSTEIN: THE LIFE, TIMES AND MURDER OF THE CRIMINAL 
GENIUS WHO FIXED THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (2003); BENJAMIN STOLBERG, TAILOR’S 
PROGRESS: THE STORY OF A FAMOUS UNION AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT 138 (1944). 
 
Labor interests were so powerful that not only did the New York 
 67 STOLBERG, supra note 66, at 138. 
 68 EDWARD BEHR, PROHIBITION: THIRTEEN YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 238 
(1996); SELWYN RAAB, FIVE FAMILIES: THE RISE, DECLINE, AND RESURGENCE OF 
AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL MAFIA EMPIRES 37 (2005). 
 69 MARY M. STOLBERG, FIGHTING ORGANIZED CRIME: POLITICS, JUSTICE AND THE 
LEGACY OF THOMAS E. DEWEY 50-51 (1995). 
 70 4 STATE OF NEW YORK, REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 3441 (1915). 
 71 Id. 
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Constitution of 1938 require judicial authorization for a wiretap, 
but the proposed provision to make the exclusionary rule part of 
the Constitution barely failed in the convention.72 The 
exclusionary rule has, of course, been one of the most popularly 
maligned rules of criminal procedure, comparable only with the 
public’s distaste for the warnings arrestees must be given under 
Miranda v. Arizona.73
At the national level, a variety of labor groups similarly 
argued that Congress should forbid wiretapping. In 1941, a 
variety of labor groupsincluding the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (who 
were separate groups at this point)joined a host of other labor 
organizations including the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen, the 
American Newspaper Guild, the United Federal Workers of 
America, and the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in 
opposing wiretapping.
 
74 Like their labor counterparts who 
advocated limits on wiretapping in the New York Constitution a 
few years earlier, these labor organizations raised generic 
concerns about the power of the government to eavesdrop on its 
citizens.75 The American Federation of Labor additionally 
observed that unions had a unique concern. The government, as 
the AFL observed, may assert an interest in strike busting in an 
actual, or claimed, interest in national security.76
V. THE NEXT COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION 
 Highly 
influential labor groups thus joined the logical opponents of 
wiretapping—telephone companies—in opposing the power of 
government to intercept telephone calls. 
As we enter our second communications revolution, no group 
has emerged with the influence of organized labor in the 1930s, or 
with the purity of interest of Western Union in the 1870s. As 
before, and predictably, a gap exists between the new technology 
                                                                                                             
 72 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY 
IN NEW YORK, 1920-80, at 125-27 (2001). 
 73 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 74 To Authorize Wiretappings: Hearing on H.R. 2266 and H.R. 3099 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 34, 75, 100, 131, 171, 237 (1941). 
 75 Id. at 34-35, 76-77, 91-94, 131-32. 
 76 Id. at 35. 
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and the law that will protect the privacy of customers using the 
new technology. However, it is not clear that the gap will be filled 
this time. Under the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 
1986, the government can obtain access to e-mails, mobile location 
information, information stored in computer “clouds,” and 
information in social networking sites by demonstrating that the 
information is merely “relevant” to a criminal investigation.77
As the social world moves from telephones to cell phones, e-
mails, texts, and instant messages, it is hardly satisfactory to say 
that the degree of privacy varies with the manner of technology 
chosen. As the world evolves to cell phones, the land-line holdout 
cannot expect to be a part of a business and social world that now 
expects everyone to carry telephone and e-mail service in a pocket 
or purse.
 
78 As text messaging replaces cell phone calls, the person 
who cannot or will not use text messaging is left out. To do 
business, or be social, we must use technology not yet protected 
from the government’s prying eye. Insisting on a manner of 
communication with greater legal protections for ordinary 
conversation is reminiscent of the television sitcom spy Maxwell 
Smart’s constant insistence on using the awkward and 
inconvenient cone of silence to prevent interception.79
The use of new technology is thus, on some level, essential. 
Legislative innovations to protect privacy in these technologies is, 
 
                                                                                                             
 77 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(i)(III) (2006) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter 
for a person acting under color of law to intercept the wire or electronic 
communications of a computer trespasser transmitted to, through, or from the 
protected computer, if . . . (III) the person acting under color of law has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of the computer trespasser’s communications will 
be relevant to the investigation . . . .”). 
 78 Justice Kennedy recognized that: 
Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some 
persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments 
for self-expression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case 
for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices 
has made them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who 
need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and 
pay for their own. 
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2010). 
 79 Biography for Don Adams, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0010915/bio 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2012) (documenting that NBC hired Don Adams to star as 
Maxwell Smart, the “bumbling yet intrepid secret agent,” in the Mel Brooks and Buck 
Henry spy spoof Get Smart in 1965). 
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however, certainly not inevitable. The degree of privacy we 
enjoyed from government interception of telegraphed messages 
(enjoyed before Western Union sent its last telegraph, that is), and 
enjoy from government intrusion on telephone calls, did not 
accompany these new technologies from their inception. The new 
forms of communication were not initially covered by laws limiting 
older forms of communication. Despite Western Union’s 
arguments, telegraphs were not regarded to have inherited the 
legal protections afforded items sent through the mail. Despite 
statutory prohibitions on any interception of telephone calls, 
government snoops were believed to have limitless powers to tap 
telephones wires. Powerful advocacy groups convinced lawmakers 
to extend the privacy protection to new forms of communication. 
No similar groups appear on the horizon to ensure that privacy 
interests in these new modes of media technology will be 
protected. 
No technology provider is poised to do the advocacy work of a 
nineteenth-century Western Union or an early-twentieth century 
Atlantic Telegraph and Telephone Company. Presently an 
organization called Digital Due Process is lobbying Congress to 
update the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to 
require greater protection from government intervention in new 
technologies.80 The group includes unlikely partners like America 
Online, Apple, Americans for Tax Reform, the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and AT&T (to take a demonstrative sample 
whose sole common characteristic seems to be preserving 
alliteration in the list).81
There are reasons to believe this unlikely collection of actors 
will not be successful. Unlike Google or AOL, neither Western 
Union nor AT&T came to legislators or courts with unclean hands. 
 
                                                                                                             
 80 ECPA Reform: Why Now?, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/ 
index.cfm?objectid=26802940-3840-11DF84C7000C296BA163 (last visited Jan.. 22, 
2012) (discussing the latest news on ECPA reform and related issues); see also 
Gautham Nagesh, Sen. Leahy Introduces Update to Digital Privacy law, HILL (May 17, 
2011, 1:54 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/161691-sen-leahy-
introduces-update-to-digital-privacy-law. 
 81 Other high profile members of this organization include eBay, Facebook, Google, 
IBM, and the Newspaper Association of America. See Who We Are, DIGITAL DUE 
PROCESS, http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=DF652CE0-2552-11DF-
B455000C296BA163 (last visited Jan. 22, 2012). 
988 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 81:5 
Google, AOL, and others examine the content of e-mail messages 
to sell IP addresses to manufacturers interested in selling me 
quality barbeque sauce and single barrel bourbon, for instance.82
Similarly, there is no consumer group positioned to take over 
the role that organized labor played in the privacy debates. Unlike 
Western Union in the late 1800s or AT&T in the early 1900s, 
organized labor’s hands were far from clean, though they may not 
have been as thoroughly dirty as Thomas Dewey suggested. 
Organized labor did, however, have influence in Congress and 
state legislatures that the ACLU could never boast.
 
Google, AOL, and others then are not the best champions of 
liberty when they ask Congress to place limits on the 
government’s ability to acquire information about drug dealing or 
terrorist plots. 
83
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there seems to be less 
public concern over privacy at the turn of the twenty-first century 
than there was at the turn of the twentieth century. Corporations 
do not expect protecting privacy to be essential to retaining 
existing customers and attracting new ones. Qwest alone resisted 
the government’s requests to tap the international calls of its 
subscribers as part of the National Security Agency’s highly 




With Facebook and Twitter, Americans themselves have 
grown accustomed, not necessarily to government eavesdropping, 
but to broadcasting virtually every detail of their lives to anyone 
who cares to surf the web. When a telegraph operator in the 
nineteenth century read a message he conveyed, it was not 
because the sender desired him to know the contents. When a 
telephone operator, or nosey member of a party line, listened in on 
a conversation in the early twentieth century, it was not because 
the parties to the conversation wished to broadcast their 
 
                                                                                                             
 82 See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 7. 
 83 See generally About the ACLU, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/about-aclu-0 (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2011) (“The ACLU also works to extend rights to segments of our 
population that have traditionally been denied their rights, including people of color; 
women; lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and transgender people; prisoners; and people 
with disabilities.”). 
 84 See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA 
TODAY, May 11, 2006, at A1. 
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discussion. In modern society, discussions that are seemingly 
relevant to only two people appear on publically viewable 
Facebook walls or Twitter feeds. Companies like Facebook, AOL, 
and Google introduced us to the ability to broadcast every detail of 
our lives and feed our addiction to do so. 
We are no longer a private people. We live out loud. Perhaps 
quite naturally, there is no one poised to vigorously represent 
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